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The paper uses the ‘political opportunity structure’ model to show how suicide missions and 
political violence are legitimized by militant groups to their constituency, and how constituency 
can act as one of the constraints on the militant group. Militant groups in situations of contentious 
politics in ethno nationalist conflicts need the support and social sanction of the constituency they 
claim to represent. Research shows that suicide missions occur where there is social sanction and 
support from the constituency for the tactic, but constituencies in democracies do not support 
suicide missions and/or other militant attacks, carried out in their name, where there are high 
civilian casualty rates. The paper argues that groups in ethno nationalist conflicts legitimize the 
resort to extreme political violence, such as suicide missions, to their constituency using the 
political opportunity structure model.  There are many explanations given for why suicide missions 
occur, such as religion, lethality, poverty and psychological problems, but current explanations 
focus primarily on the presence of suicide missions. However, this paper also looks at the absence 
of suicide missions by militant groups in situations of contentious politics and conflict. It does this 
using two case studies: one where suicide missions are absent (the IRA in Northern Ireland) and 
another where there is the presence of suicide missions (Hamas in Israel/Palestine).  
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When suicide bombers flew aeroplanes into the Twin Towers and killed almost 3,000 
people on the 11
th Sept 2001, it shook the world. People could not understand why 
they did it. What drove terrorists to kill themselves and so many innocent people? 
Why did they want to inflict so much suffering so badly? The attacks signified a 
major development, and while suicide missions are a relatively new phenomenon in 
the West, they have been proliferating worldwide since the 1980s, most notable being 
used by Islamic groups in the Middle East and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. What is 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank participants of the 'Contested Constitutionalisation' workshop at ECPR's Joint 
Sessions in Rennes and UCD's Graduate Symposium, for their helpful comments and discussions of 
earlier versions of this paper. Specific thanks also goes to the anonymous ConWeb reviewers who 
provided excellent feedback. 
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worrying however is their increased use, the frequency of attacks, in the geographical 
spread of attacks and in the number of groups involved (Merari, 2005, 70).  
 
What are these suicide missions, why are they being used, and why are they being 
used more frequently? Ariel Merari defines suicide missions as situations in which “a 
person intentionally kills himself (or herself) for the purpose of killing others, in the 
service of a political or ideological goal” (Merari, 2005, 71). There are varying 
reasons offered as to why they are being used, and why they are being used more 
frequently. Some explanations include: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, suicide 
attacks are more lethal and effective than ordinary forms of terrorism, effects of 
poverty and psychological reasons.  
 
The paper begins by explaining the ‘political opportunity structure’ model and how 
constituency can be seen to act as a constraint. It then maps out the existing research 
on suicide missions to show its limitations. While none of the existing explanations 
are mono-causal, the paper argues that the explanations reviewed are not sufficient 
without reference to the political context within which there are contentious politics. 
Therefore the paper will discuss two case studies, Hamas in Israel/Palestine and the 
IRA in Northern Ireland. Using two case studies permits an exploration of the utility 
of constituency as a partial factor in the resort to, or absence of, suicide missions. 
However, the author notes that there are limitations in using only two case studies, 
rather than a large N approach. The two case studies are Northern Ireland and 
Israel/Palestine. In Northern Ireland, where there was democracy, there was an 
absence of suicide missions, and in the occupied Palestinian territories, which is not a 
democracy, suicide missions were carried out. This begs the question: why are suicide 
missions accepted/rejected in certain societies? Finally the paper will look at the 
limits of examining ‘constituency’ with regards to transglobal religious groups, who 
are less constrained than ethno nationalist groups. 
 
‘Political opportunity structure’ and constituency 
Despite all the reasons as to why terrorist groups or individuals use, and/or engage in, 
suicide missions, it must be said that many groups do not use suicide missions 
because they didn’t know about them, there are moral and/or ideological constraints, 
counterproductive effects, constituency and technological costs (Kalyvas and 
  2   
Sanchez-Cuenca, 2005, 210-228). The paper argues that constituency costs, as 
identified above, are one of the main constraints. Militant groups do not use tactics 
that they know will have constituency costs. They understand that violence limits the 
constituency and support base because violence “restrains and frightens off 
sympathisers” (Tarrow, 1998, 16). As Bloom has argued “supporters are needed to 
provide food, safe houses, recruits and ultimately political power” (Bloom, 2005, 78) 
and it is the constituency who determines if suicide missions will be used: “suicide 
terror will either be sanctioned or prohibited by the civilian population” (Bloom, 
2005, 17). 
 
Given that democracies do not sanction the use of anti civilian violence which targets 
and indiscriminately kills civilians we need to look at why this is so. The traditional 
meaning of ‘democracy’ is - rule by and of the people (Tully, 2006, 3). The word 
‘democracy’ has its roots in the Greek term demokratia, the individual parts of which 
are demos (people) and kratos (rule). In its basic meaning democracy is therefore a 
political system in which ‘the people’ rule (Giddens, 2001, 422). Among the basic 
principles of democracy are constitutionalism, democratic elections, an independent 
judiciary, free media and freedom of expression, protection of minority rights and 
civilian control of the military. Democracy is generally seen as the political system 
which is most able to ensure political equality, protect liberty and freedom, defend the 
common interest, meet citizens’ needs, promote moral self-development and enable 
decision making which takes everyone’s interests into account (Held, 1996). A regime 
can be deemed to be democratic “to the degree that political relations between the 
state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding 
consultation” (Tilly, 2007, 13-14). 
 
If we look at democracies
2, such as Northern Ireland and Spain, we see that the IRA 
or ETA did not use extreme forms of violence, such as suicide missions. This is partly 
because both countries were democracies, and the principles of democracy, which the 
constituency adheres to, as well as social support, constrained the actions of both 
groups. For example the constituency of the IRA did not want extreme political 
violence to be carried out by the IRA, acting as their representatives, especially where 
                                                 
2 But that is not to say that there can’t be de-democratization (Tilly, 2007) during a period of 
contentious politics. 
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there were other political avenues, and other forms of contestation and negotiation 
available. For the militants “a trade off exists between the intensity of killing or the 
selectivity of violence on the one hand and popular support on the other” (Kalyvas 
and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2005, 219). If the IRA carried out “systematic indiscriminate 
bombings, support among important sectors of the nationalist communities would 
wane and the pool of volunteers would probably shrink” (Kalyvas and Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2005, 219). But militants are pursuing a political aim, and when there is lack 
of opportunity to forward a political agenda through contestation within the power 
structure they may resort to forwarding their agenda through violence, even if they 
live in a democracy. Both Hamas and the IRA legitimized their use of political 
violence by using the concepts from the classic social movement model of ‘political 
opportunity structure’. 
 
The classic social movement model has a number of key concepts: in a situation of 
contentious politics social change processes happen when there are political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, collective action frames and repertoires of 
contention (Tarrow, 1998). In a situation of contentious politics people “make 
discontinuous, public, collective claims” on one another and the claims, if realized, 
will “affect their objects’ interests” (Tilly, 2003, 26-30). Contentious politics can be 
viewed as a form of ‘collective political struggle’ (McAdam et al, 2001, 5) and some 
forms of contentious politics, which “almost always involve collective contention” 
include: rebellions, revolutions, social movements and demonstrations (Tilly, 2003, 
30). Movements and militants involved in contentious politics realise that in order to 
attract people to the group the issues “must be presented or framed so that they fit or 
resonate with the beliefs, feelings, and desires of potential recruits” (Goodwin, 2003, 
52).  
 
The political opportunity structure model emerged from the work being done on 
social movements by political process theorists in the United States: McAdam (1982), 
Tarrow (1983) and Tilly (1978). It was part of the wider body of research being 
conducted on social movements, which grew enormously in the aftermath of the 
1960s civil rights movements. There were a number of different approaches and 
conceptual “turns” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003, 5) within social movement theory 
from the 1960s onwards: economic (Olson, 1965), rational choice and resource 
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mobilization (McCarthy and Zald, 1973), political process (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly) and cultural approaches, such as creating framing and collective identity (Snow, 
1988; Gamson 1992; Klandersman, 1984). While this paper acknowledges the vast 
body of literature in social movement theory, it specifically uses the political 
opportunity structure model to deal with the issue of ethno nationalist conflicts and 
the militants who operate in these conflicts. In doing so, it adopts an” integrated study 
of contentious politics focusing on episodes of contention” and using a “mechanism-
and-process approach” (McAdam et al, 2009, 7).  
 
The political opportunity structure approach is a political process approach and pays 
“systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which social 
movements operate” (Della Porta, 2006, 16) and “stresses the crucial importance of 
expanding political opportunities as the ultimate spur to collective action” (McAdam, 
1996, 7). At different stages in the conflict militants will choose to use different 
tactics, depending on the levels of support and sanction, so it is important to look at 
the political developments, and the political opportunities, open to the militants when 
examining when they use political violence and when they don’t. In a situation of 
contentious politics, when there is an absence of democracy, there are fewer 
opportunities to contest, negotiate and forward a political agenda. Militant groups can 
emerge at this point to forward a political agenda and challenge the political system 
through violence, in the absence of other political opportunities. But they must first 
mobilize and receive support from ‘constituency’, because they are constrained by the 
people they claim to represent, and require social sanction from them, in order to 
forward their agenda, especially if they are to use tactics such as suicide missions 
(Bloom, 2007).  
 
The political process approach focuses on the political context within which social 
movements, and those wishing to challenge the status quo, operate. It recognises that 
“social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political 
constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are 
embedded” (McAdam et al, 1996, 3). This is important, especially when examining 
why militants in the contexts of Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine were attempting 
to forward their political agenda, but choose to forward that political agenda through 
violence, at certain times in the conflict. They had scope conditions and specific 
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political grievances, but they needed opportunity to act. They needed to seize 
opportunity, and in order to do so they needed to mobilize their constituency and 
frame the conflict in a way that appealed to the constituency. The political process 
approach uses these three sets of factors in order to analyse social movements: 
“political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes” (McAdam et al, 
1996, 2). These three factors are crucial to understanding how militant groups in 
ethno nationalist conflicts legitimise their actions to the constituency they claim to 
represent. The paper uses the political opportunity structure concept because it 
provides us with a concept that can show us how militant groups legitimise political 
violence, and in doing so shows us how we can constrain such violence.  
 
Like any social movement, militant groups require opportunities, such as changes to 
the openness, stability, allies and the capacity of the state (McAdam et al, 1996, 10). 
But militants are also aware of threat, such as regime or government repression, 
where efforts are made “to suppress either contentious acts or groups and 
organisations responsible for them” (McAdam et al, 2001). Social movements must 
examine opportunity and threat, and they must decide whether to act or not, based on 
that opportunity and/or threat. “Opportunity is always in interaction with current and 
repressive threats” (Goldstone and Tilly, 2002, 193) and “increased repression leads 
to  increased  protest, mobilization and action” (Goldstone and Tilly, 2002, 181). 
Militants are aware of this and may provoke attacks against themselves, hoping for a 
heavy handed response which is turn gives them, and their cause, more legitimacy. 
This can be seen in the U shaped repression curve where “state responses shape the 
evolution of collective action” (Tarrow, 1998b, 133) and in Della Porta’s study of 
political violence and the state, where political violence can “be explained as an 
outcome of the interaction between the social movements and their opponents” (Della 
Porta, 1995, 8). 
 
The political opportunity structure is a useful model with which to examine how 
militant groups legitimise political violence, but it is also a highly contested tool. It is 
contested because of the general methodological concerns of social movement 
theorists, but also because of different approaches within social movement theory 
itself. Methodological concerns have arisen regarding what constitutes variables of 
political opportunity, and some fear the concept runs the risk of becoming a “dustbin 
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for any and every variable relevant to the development of social movements” due to 
its lack of specificity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, 19). A second methodological 
concern is how we “distinguish between ‘objective’ political reality and its social 
construction” (Della Porta and Diana, 2006, 19), whereby there can be “a mismatch” 
between the reality of opportunity and the perception of opportunity (Kurzman, 2003, 
47). As well as the methodological issues within social movement theory there are 
also different approaches: structural and cultural, which examine different kinds of 
social movements and by adopting different tools, methods and concepts they have 
clashed and disagreed with one another (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). However, by 
examining the key components of the political opportunity structure, in a structured, 
focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005) the paper can deal with the 
methodological concerns that have been expressed. Also, despite the fact that the 
concept is contested, a synthesis of the main approaches actually enhances the 
explanatory power of the model (McAdam et al, 2009, 7), and highlights the poverty 
of other explanations in the literature. 
 
Poverty of the current explanations of suicide missions 
The resort to suicide missions is complex and there is no one singular explanation. 
The various explanations in the literature can be arranged into four different 
explanatory categories: religion and Islam, strategic logic, poverty and education, and 
psychological profiling.  
 
Religion and Islam 
One of the most popular explanations for the presence of suicide missions is Islam, 
and Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism are usually blamed for the increased 
popularity of suicide missions. But many do not agree that religion, of any kind, is the 
actual reason or cause. Before the Iraq war in 2003
3 groups with secular orientations 
accounted for about one third of suicide attacks, and the world’s leader in suicide 
missions was not actually an Islamic group but, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a group which recruits from the predominantly Hindu Tamil population in 
Sri Lanka and which has an ideology with Marxist/Leninist elements (Pape, 2003, 
                                                 
3 The large number of suicide missions and the resulting death casualties from suicide missions in the 
Iraq war has never been previously recorded and it drastically changes the statistics.  
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343). This means that no religion, let alone a specific one like Islam, is a necessary 
part of the explanation for suicide missions (Hopgood, 2005, 76).  
 
However, religion can play a role in legitimizing suicide missions. People like Osama 
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the planners behind the suicide missions, exploit 
and use Islam and religious rhetoric to create a specific narrative of blame, in order to 
rally Muslim youth (Holmes, 2005, 169). Religious beliefs offer huge potential to the 
militants to exploit religion, and to use it to encourage patriotism, hatred of the enemy 
and a sense of victimization (Sprinzak, 2000, 4). The social movement approach 
regards religion as one of the key elements
4 in terms of how a group frames its 
conflict and mobilizes people within that cultural, social and political grouping.  
 
Strategic Logic and Lethality  
Perhaps “the main reason suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned 
that it works” (Pape, 2003, 350). Suicide attacks have a strategic logic to achieve 
specific political purposes: to coerce a target government to change policy, to 
mobilize additional recruits and to gain financial support (Pape, 2003, 344), or they 
may also be used specifically “in competition with other terrorist groups for popular 
or financial support” (Bloom, 2005, 1). Also “suicide attacks on average kill four 
times as many people as other terrorist attacks” (Hoffmann, 2003, 42) and if the 
purpose is to kill as many people as possible and to inflict huge military damage then 
the militant has succeed. However, there are constituency costs to using forms of 
extreme political violence that targets civilians, especially in democracies as outlined 
above.  
 
Poverty and Economics  
World leaders and terrorism experts continually reinforce the idea that poverty and a 
lack of education are the root causes of terrorism, and that we should put money into 
addressing poverty and education
5. But terrorists have levels of educational 
                                                 
4 Ethnicity, religion and nationalism (Tarrow, 1998) are three key mobilizing factors used by those 
using collective action frames and wishing to mobilize supporters. 
5 For example Jessica Stern, Harvard terrorism lecturer and author of ‘The Ultimate Terrorists,’ points 
out: “We have a stake in the welfare of other peoples and need to devote a much higher priority to 
health, education, and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise” (Stern, 2001, 
355-357).  
 
  8   
attainment that are at, or slightly above, the societal mean and are less likely to live in 
poverty than the average person (De Mesquita, 2005, 1). Neither the participants nor 
the adherents of militant activities in the Middle East are recruited from the poor, and 
poverty on the national level does not predict the number of attacks carried out by 
individuals from a country (Maleckova, 2005, 41). Indeed” if there is a link between 
income level, education, and participation in terrorist activities, it is either very weak 
or in the opposite direction of what one intuitively might have expected” (Berrebi, 
2003, 43- 45). 
 
Psychological reasoning and profiling  
There is also no apparent connection between violent militant activity and personality 
disorders (Ricolfi, 2005, 105). Many cases show “suicide terrorists do not differ in 
their psychological characteristics (and often also in their sociological features) from 
their peers” (Pedahzur, 2005, 23). In the Palestinian context, fragile and disturbed 
personalities are excluded because they affect group stability, they are a liability 
(Ricolfi, 2005) (Hudson, 1999) (Goldenberg, 2002a) and because suicide bombers 
need “the full control of their mental ability for succeeding in their lethal project 
(Azam, 2005, 177). “Suicide has had a long and explicit role in politics and in 
conflict,” and “the continued use of suicide (in however limited a fashion) within 
political and military conflicts is then not entirely bizarre nor inexplicable” (Silke, 
2006, 44). Reducing the explanations for suicide bombing to the mental illness, evil 
and irrationality of the bombers, does not enlighten our understanding of why suicide 
bombings occur (Euben, 2002, 4). In fact studies found that the suicide bombers are 
not suicidal, and are not psychotic or mentally unstable.  
 
The attacks on the Twin Towers, as well as suicide missions in Sri Lanka, Bali, 
Madrid, London, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel-Palestine and Iraq all 
beg the question: why? And as the number of suicide missions increase, and spread 
geographically: there are more victims and we need to find answers, to that question: 
why? Various studies and researchers have offered hypotheses, models and theories to 
explain the phenomenon. Some causes put forth are: religion, strategic logic, poverty 
and economics, and psychological reasoning. But, the existence of secular groups 
rules out religion as the cause and not all suicide bombers are Muslim, so that rules 
out Islam as a cause. The absence of suicide missions in some conflicts rule out 
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strategic logic as a singular cause, because not all groups use suicide missions despite 
their lethality. The fact that the bombers range from rich to impoverished and from 
poorly educated to highly educated rules out poverty and lack of education. Finally, 
saying that the suicide bombers are crazy and evil, as well as being factually incorrect, 
is not a logical, reasoned, critical analysis.  
 
The resort to suicide missions is complex and while the current explanations are not 
mono-causal the paper argues that the current set of explanations is incomplete 
without examining how militants legitimize the use of political violence to the 
constituency and is incomplete without reference to constituency (in democracies or 
otherwise). That is not to say that any singular explanatory approach is sufficient but 
rather that using the ‘political opportunity structure’ theory, which is a political 
process approach, offers a more contextualised theoretical framework, that at the very 
least supplements the other explanations, by identifying where there are political 
opportunities and constraints within a political system, for political and militant 
actors, and where violence may emerge at certain times. It does this by examining two 
case studies: Hamas in Israel/Palestine and the IRA in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
CASE STUDY ONE: HAMAS IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE 
The paper uses ‘political opportunity structure’ to show how suicide missions, and 
political violence, are legitimised to the constituency of the militant group, and the 
crucial role of constituency. In doing so it is crucial to examine the tactics used by the 
militant group in relation to the political process. In the case of Hamas, they began as 
a small militant resistance group with little support, and were outside of the formal 
political and peace negotiations. But gradually they overtook the dominant Palestinian 
party Fatah, in terms of political support, and the political wing of Hamas won the 
parliamentary elections. They started out with the view that militancy would serve 
them best but as they prepared to enter politics they observed a three year truce (2005-
2008), which shows they can adapt and change with the demands of the constituency. 
As well as using suicide missions when there was a demand for such tactics, or not 
using them when there was no support, they also used suicide missions strategically as 
a tactic.  
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Regarding the use of suicide missions, analysis by Gupta and Mundra between 1991 
and 2003 revealed that they were actually part of an intensely political series of moves 
by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and were a strategic weapon (Gupta and Mundra, 2005, 
591). Suicide attacks, like other forms of terrorism, can be used by terrorists to break 
up peace processes, (Kydd and Walter, 2002, 263) or provoke attacks upon 
themselves, which in turn generate sympathy and support (De Figueiredo and 
Weingast, 2001, 2-3). Other tactical advantages include the fact that suicide missions 
are simple and low cost, the bombers die so there is no fear they will surrender 
information if caught, and psychologically it has a huge impact on the public, due to 
an overwhelming sense of helplessness (Sprinzak, 2000, 2-3).  
 
This feeling of helplessness makes suicide missions a more effective form of 
psychological warfare because there is no justice for the victims; society cannot find 
the perpetrator and prosecute them because they are already dead, and with no justice 
it is more difficult for society to cope (Holmes, 2004, 163). As a military objective, 
“spreading fear among the Israelis was as important as killing them” for the suicide 
bombers Hassan spoke to; Anwar Aziz, an Islamic Jihad member who blew himself 
up in an ambulance in Gaza in December 1993, had often told friends, "Battles for 
Islam are won not through the gun but by striking fear into the enemy's heart" 
(Hassan, 2001, 5). 
 
The first suicide mission where a suicide bomber blew himself up in Israel was to 
follow a depressingly familiar pattern in years to come. On the 16
th April 1993 a 
Hamas suicide bomber blew himself up, as he drove into two buses at a rest stop in 
Mehola, killing another man and injuring eight people (Immanuel, 1993). Once again 
on the 16
th April 1994 the bomber detonated a car bomb near a school bus in Afula, 
killing him and eight others, as well as injuring over fifty people. The bombing was 
claimed by Hamas, and was said to be in response to the deaths of the 29 Muslims 
who were killed by the Jewish settler Bernard Goldstein, in t h e  T o m b  o f  t h e  
Patriarchs shrine in Hebron (Brown, 1994). There have been over 140 suicide 
missions since that suicide mission on the 16
th April 1993, in the Israel and Palestine 
area. The missions were planned and organized over a twenty year period, by a 
number of Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah-
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Tanzim, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 




th of December 1987 the senior membership of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan) in the Gaza Strip met and “took the historic decision to transform the 
Ikhwan organisation in Palestine into a resistance movement” called Hamas (Tamimi, 
2007, 11). They emerged as an Islamic alternative to the PLO during the first Intifada 
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas began using suicide missions to 
destabilise the peace process and to undermine the PA (Bloom, 2007, 24). Their first 
suicide mission was on the 16
th April 1993 when a Hamas suicide bomber blew 
himself up (Immanuel, 1993). Since then Hamas has been involved in over fifty 
suicide missions (De Búrca, 2006) and are now synonymous with its use worldwide.   
 
As well as its military wing Hamas also had an “extensive network of social services, 
which bolstered its popularity among impoverished Palestinians” (Bloom, 2007, 25). 
Hamas was able to successfully put together a mass political movement that directly 
challenged the power and authority of the PLO. The rise of Hamas is further 
attributed to the frustration of the Palestinian populace regarding the inability of the 
PA to deliver a transparent, democratic, and efficient administration (Gupta, 2005, 
576). This frustration was translated into democratic political action when the 
Palestinian people (77 per cent turnout) voted for Hamas in the Palestinian 
parliamentary elections on the 25
th January 2006 and Hamas won 76 of the 132 seats 
in the chamber (BBC, 26.01.06).  
 
There was international shock with the announcement of the results. But the official 
pollsters “were wrong in predicting Hamas would lose” (Tamimi, 2007, 218) and 
there had been indicators that a Hamas victory was possible. There had been the 
“gradual erosion of both the legitimacy and popularity of the PLO” (Hroub, 2006, xv), 
and in municipal and university elections Hamas regularly won 40 per cent of the 
vote. In the parliamentary elections they won 44.45 per cent (Tamimi, 2007, 219). 
The reason for the Hamas victory was quite simply: “half of voters supported Hamas 
for its programmes and declared objectives” which included more general Palestinian 
issues such as: “frustrations of the peace talks”, “Israeli brutality” and “failure of 
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Fatah” (Hroub, 2006, 66-67). But furthermore people voted for Hamas, as an 
organisation because of “Hamas’s fidelity to the Palestinian dream,” “as a provider of 
services” and its “Islamic ideology” (Tamimi, 2007, 220-221).  
 
Social Support and Sanction 
Even if the organisers and the bombers, such as Hamas, were willing to use suicide 
bombings, how did the community come to accept such an extreme form of violence 
and how were suicide bombings given social sanction? Militant groups are 
constrained by their constituencies, but the Palestinians became increasingly 
supportive of suicide missions, which in turn gave normative support to the use of 
extreme violence by militants. This support and sanction is then vocalised by the 
media, and reinforced by political and religious leaders, which in turn leads to a 
normative acceptance of, and basis for, suicide missions and creates opportunities for 
militants to carry out suicide missions.   
 
There was a rise in support amongst Palestinians for suicide bomb attacks, for 
example a poll by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in 
September 2004 shows a large percentage of Palestinians supporting bombing attacks 
inside Israel, including the Beer Shiva attack of early September which received the 
support of 77 per cent of the people surveyed (Palestinian Centre for Policy and 
Survey Research, Sept 2004). As Tamimi explains: “the more the Palestinians have 
felt vulnerable, the more they supported martyrdom operations and even demanded 
more” (Tamimi, 2007, 161). This represents a normative change and as a result during 
the four years of al-Aqsa Intifada there was an increase in the incidences of suicide 
missions, and the number of participants and volunteers for suicide missions.  
 
Suicide missions and terrorist attacks have two purposes: to gain support and to 
coerce opponents. Most terrorism accomplishes both, and simultaneously mobilizes 
support for the cause (Pape, 2003, 345). The media is increasingly instrumental in 
broadcasting the attack, the message and the violence, and adding to the fears of the 
public. As compared to direct attacks and person-to-person negotiation, broadcast of 
the social movements claims by means of public media reaches far more third parties 
(Tilly, 2003, 84). Violence is the most visible trace of collective action, in 
contemporary news coverage and it is guaranteed to make news headlines on a 
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national and international basis, bringing more attention to the political cause 
(Tarrow, 1998, 94).  
 
As well as indirectly affecting public discourse through actions and indirect 
statements, political and religious leaders also give explicit and direct social sanction 
to suicide missions, both through their choice of language and by actually saying 
suicide missions are acceptable. For example, in 2001 the association of Palestinian 
religious scholars gave its sanction to ‘martyrdom operations.’ It said suicide attacks, 
were a legitimate part of jihad, or a just war, because they “destroy the enemy and put 
fear in the hearts of the enemy, provoke the enemy, shake the foundations of its 
establishment and make it think of leaving Palestine. It will reduce the numbers of 
Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and it will make them [Israel] suffer financially” 
(Goldenberg, 2002a).  
 
Conditions and Political Opportunity Structure  
Elements of social movement theory are used in both case studies, similar to work 
done by Hafez and De Búrca with regards to suicide missions in Iraq and Palestine 
(De Búrca, 2006; Hafez, 2007). In the Palestinian context, whatever the source of 
contentious claims that the militant groups voiced, it was, and is, political 
opportunities and constraints that translate claims into action, action such as using 
suicide missions to forward the political agenda. However, in order to undertake such 
extreme action the group must identify a common enemy, a source of injustice and 
frame contention through the construction of identity (Tarrow, 1998, 106). The 
conflict in Israel and Palestine provides a perfect opportunity, because Palestine has 
become “the Muslim grievance par excellence” (Ayoob, 2005, 960).  
 
It’s hardly surprising that the issue of Palestine was to become a grievance par 
excellence. The Balfour Declaration, the massacre at Deir Yassin, and the UN 
Partition Plan were all historical sources of injustice and are frequently mentioned as 
sources of grievance by militants. For example, the UN Partition Plan gave 57 per 
cent of the land of Palestine to a third of the population, and after the 1948 war, “the 
Zionists, allotted 57 per cent of Palestine under the Partition Plan had occupied 77 per 
cent of the country. Of the 1,300,000 Arab inhabitants, they had displaced nearly 
900,000” (Hirst, 2003, 267; Hroub, 2006, 4-5). Unjust actions were further imposed 
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and reinforced through laws such as the 1950 Law for Acquisition of Absentee 
Property and the Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Areas 
(Hirst, 2003, 314-315; Pilger, 2006, 104).  
 
There are still grievances: the situation of land grabs, demolishment of Palestinian 
homes, and huge illegal settlement expansions, all of which provoke even more anger 
and despair (Fisk, 2005, 525), as do extra judicial killings, collective punishment, lack 
of fair trials, daily humiliation at checkpoints, economic hardship and personal grief 
(Hass, 2000; Chehab, 2007). Research by Saleh has shown that relative deprivation 
coupled with emotional grievance “are strongly associated with increasing use and 
public support for the most desperate and devastating form of contemporary political 
violence, the suicide attack” (Saleh, 2004, 1). 
 
Palestinians inside the territories gradually developed a common political 
consciousness, and infrastructure of cooperation and communication and were fully 
embedded within a conflict framework (Alimi, 2003, 125). There was a 
subordinate/dominate relationship and Israel became the Palestinians’ direct target of 
discontent. But given the relationship structure the Palestinians still needed to seize an 
opportunity (Alimi, 2003, 126). Contentious politics are triggered and transformed 
when there are “identity shifts, brokerage, radicalisation and convergence” (McAdam, 
2001, 187). Opportunities as such arose with the failure of political avenues, like 
Camp David, where there was an increased demand by Palestinians for action, a 
radicalisation and the framing of a common purpose and identity, as well as a 
common source of discontent: Israel. 
 
If we look at the waves of suicide missions in Israel and Palestine, each has an 
opportunity basis. The first wave of suicide missions was in response to the massacre 
in Hebron by Bernard Goldstein, and was also the start of the Oslo wave, where 
political opportunities were limited, and deemed to be failing. The Al Aqsa Intifada 
was also a response to political opportunities. The al Aqsa Intifada broke out at the 
end of September 2000. Yassar Arafat had walked out of the Camp David Summit in 
July 2000 and frustrations that years of the negotiation had failed to deliver a 
Palestinian state were intensified by the collapse. The spark that ignited this Intifada 
“was the provocative visit of Ariel Sharon, accompanied by hundreds of Israeli 
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soldiers, to Al Haram al-Sharif,” the site in East Jerusalem, which houses the Muslim 
al-Aqsa mosque (Nasser & Ibrahim, 2002, 67). The second Intifada was much more 
violent than the first and was notable for the extensive use of suicide bombings 
(Bloom, 2007, 24).   
 
Collective Action Frames 
Framing contention creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality, and can be created by 
constructing a common enemy and identity around religion, nationalism and ethnicity 
(Tarrow, 1998, 6). Palestinian militants specifically use religious revivalism, 
nationalist conflict and community ties (Hafez, 2005, 19). Many militants involved 
with Hamas speak of the injustices, sheer desperation and personal grievances driving 
the Palestinian people towards suicide missions (Fisk, 2001; Rees, 2005, 126-127) 
(Hassan, 2001). Hamas also emphasises that the Palestinians have no other options 
and need to act in self-defence. In November of 2002, Hamas leaders announced that 
if they did not use the suicide bombers, then: “we shall be back in the situation of the 
first week of the Intifada when the Israelis killed us with impunity” (Hecht, 2003, 37-
8). A Hamas leader, Ismail Abu Shanab, emphasised the suicide missions as the 
Palestinians only option against the sheer military might of the Israeli Defence Forces, 
when he asked journalist Philip Rees “if the Israeli tanks shell Palestinians, if their F-
16s and Apache helicopters send missiles at us, how should we fight back? All we can 
do is send our children to Israel and sacrifice themselves” (Rees, 2005, 126). These 
messages are repeated and they frame the politics of contention between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians in the conflict. 
 
Mobilizing Structures 
As well as mobilizing Palestinians around a common enemy and identity, Hamas also 
use structures to mobilize and concrete their political agenda. They do this through 
their existing political wing, their social support networks, and organising suicide 
missions, marches and demonstrations, and by supplying financial help the families of 
the ‘martyrs.’ It takes a support team of several militants to plan and execute a suicide 
attack, and Hamas can provide this support. “Typically, each cell for a suicide 
bombing - or for other attacks on Israel - includes a strategist who is linked to the 
higher tiers of leadership and who controls finances, an explosives technician who 
makes the bomb, a procurer for the belt or vest that will carry it, a driver to deliver it, 
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and other support staff. The bomber is reduced to a delivery system, especially in 
Hamas operations” (Goldenberg, 2001a). 
 
Following suicide missions, local chapters of Hamas set up processions to mark the 
event. “With their headgear of the shahid, slogans of martyrdom shouted, Israeli and 
American flags burned and puppets representing Israeli and American leaders stabbed 
by a frantic crowd, they arrive at the end of the procession, during which, invariably, 
they shoot abundantly in the air with illegal weapons – and then the harrowing orgy of 
‘celebrations’ begins” (Israeli, 2002, 28). They also put up posters of the bombers and 
praise him or her as a hero of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the bombers can 
also count on support from Hamas “whose political leaders make regular visits to 
their homes in the months after their attacks, and whose financial controllers keep the 
money flowing into family bank accounts” (Goldenberg, 2001a). 
 
Constituency constraint? 
The Palestinian people’s support and sanction of suicide missions falls and rises, and 
Hamas act accordingly. Groups that use suicide missions are not indifferent to the 
opinion and attitudes of their constituency: the population whose interest they claim to 
serve and from which they recruit. “In choosing tactics and targets, the group tends to 
act within the boundaries of its constituency’s approval” (Merari, 2005, 80). This can 
be seen in the last months of 1995 when Hamas stopped using suicide missions: 
mostly because “of the growing Palestinian resentment against the costs of the bus 
bombings (expressed in massive Israeli economic sanctions)” (Sprinzak, 2000, 71).  
 
There was however approval for the use of suicide missions and extreme violence, 
during the first few weeks of the Al Aqsa Intifada. “With intensified Israeli policies of 
targeted assassinations, brutalizing reoccupation, mass incarceration and starvation, 
Palestinians were not willing to be the only recipients of death and terror” (Ahmed, 
2005, 88). Corresponding to the social sanction, which was at its highest, the Intifada 
began, and it continued with social sanction and support, as well as with more 
volunteers than ever before (Merari, 2005, 81). But, Hamas also changed their tactics 
when it became strategically important to them, they went on ceasefire for a year prior 
to Palestinian elections and in total they did not carry out any suicide missions for 
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three years.  They took advantage of the opportunity to move their struggle into a 
formal political setting and forward their political agenda.  
 
Hamas are currently struggling in their new role in government in the Gaza Strip and 
are emerging from a three week invasion and attack by Israel. Israel claims the 
invasion was to put an end to Hamas rockets and to destroy the Hamas infrastructure. 
Regarding the use of suicide missions Hamas have claimed responsibility for a suicide 
mission in Israel in February 2008, breaking a three-year moratorium on such acts 
(NYT, 06.02.08). The truce ended after the Israelis fired artillery shells and one of 
them “hit a crowd of Palestinian civilians picnicking on a north Gaza beach wiping 
out almost an entire family” and killing seven people in total (Tamimi, 2007, 239). It 
also came on the back of crippling economic sanctions from Israel and the 
international community, who refused to speak with Hamas, and an internal divisive 
and violent Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fatah, in which the international 
community supported Fatah. The sanctions deepened an already calamitous situation 
and ultimately left 80 per cent of the population in Gaza dependant on food aid 
(Makdisi, 2008, 275). Given the lack of opportunities at a political level and the “calls 
for revenge by the angry masses galvanised by the heartrendering pictures of 10 year 
old Huda Ghalia running wildly along the Gaza beach, then falling weeping beside the 
body of her slain father,” “Hamas could do no less than declare an end to its unilateral 
truce” (Tamimi, 2007, 239). 
 
As well as being the first suicide bombers in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, Hamas 
pursued an overtly political agenda as well as a military one. They remained popular 
with their constituency: they were the victors in the Palestinian parliamentary 
elections in January 2006 and currently control the Gaza Strip.
6 There were both 
causal and constitutive factors at work in the Palestinian conflict prior to the use of 
suicide missions. What changed in the Palestinian context was support for, and the 
use of, suicide mission as a means of forwarding a political agenda. With change in 
the situation came political opportunities and constraints, and groups such as Hamas 
used collective action frames and mobilizing structures to construct a common 
identity, a common grievance and a common enemy. They did this through religious 
                                                 
6 However, it remains to be seen if they will retain this support following the latest Israeli invasion. 
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justifications, their existing political wing, their social support networks, and 
organising suicide missions, marches and demonstrations, and by supplying financial 
help the families of the ‘martyrs. They were always mindful not to alienate their 
constituency: the Palestinian people, for whom they were fighting this cause and from 
whom they recruited. 
 
CASE STUDY TWO: THE IRA IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
Like Hamas, the IRA was also a militant group that engaged in political violence, and 
in order to do so, they had to legitimize such actions and tactics to the constituency 
they were claiming to represent. They did this using collective action frames, 
mobilizing structures, repertoires of contention and by utilising political opportunities. 
They emerged as a militant organisation whose orders came from the IRA Army 
Council, but as time passed, and in line with political developments in Northern 
Ireland, they adopted new strategies. They moved from a military stance to the policy 
of “the Armalite and the ballot box,” which meant pursuing militancy, but also 
political engagement through their political wing, Sinn Fein. They eventually engaged 
in a successful peace process and pursued a political approach, and in later years they 
decommissioned their arms. As with the case study of Hamas, the political process is 
important in case study of the IRA and allows us to examine the tactics used in 
accordance to the politics of the time. The case of the IRA also allows us to 
concentrate on the constraints of constituency, because there was an absence of 
suicide missions in the case of Northern Ireland, and the constituency of the IRA 
rejected high civilian casualties.  
 
During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, unlike in the Palestinian territories, there 
was democracy, although limited especially in the early years of the conflict, and 
Catholics could engage in some forms of negotiation and contestation. “All the 
normal, civilised, channels of politics and diplomacy remained open throughout,” the 
conflict and “elections, parliaments and governments in Britain and the Irish Republic 
functioned unhindered” (O’Brien, 1999, 241). But, that is not to underestimate the 
scale of the conflict. It was a serious conflict situation that claimed over three 
thousand six hundred lives, contentious politics became violent and many 
paramilitary groups emerged, and targeted and killed civilians indiscriminately. 
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‘The Troubles,’ as the conflict in Northern Ireland is known, claimed over three 
thousand six hundred lives in a 30-year period (McKittrick, 1999, 1474). But the 
Troubles, which broke out in the late 1960s, had roots going back many decades 
(McKittrick, 2001, 1). There are four basic elements that make up the Northern 
Ireland equation, most important of which are the Northern Irish Protestants and 
Northern Irish Catholics. The Protestants, made up roughly two thirds, of the one and 
a half million the population, and the Catholics made up the remaining third. The vast 
majority of Protestants were Unionists, and favoured the existing link with Britain. 
But, the Catholics generally regarded themselves as Irish, not British, and believed 
Northern Ireland was an unsatisfactory, illegitimate entity. Many of them wanted a 
united Ireland. “The heart of the Northern Ireland problem lies in this clash between 
two competing national aspirations.” The two others in the Northern Ireland equation 
were the Irish and British governments (McKittrick, 2001, 1-2).  
 
The boundaries of Northern Ireland, which came into being in 1921, were essentially 
worked out by the Protestant Unionists and the British government. But, Catholics felt 
trapped and separated from the Irish state, and Protestants lived in a state of political 
nervousness, constantly fearing British policy might move to support a united Ireland. 
The basic competition was complicated further by issues of power, territory and 
justice (McKittrick, 2001, 2-3) and many of these issues remain to this day. 
 
The Provisional IRA  
For the IRA, their main objective was “to end British rule in Ireland” and “to establish 
an Irish Socialist Republic, based on the Proclamation of 1916” (O’Brien, 1999, 9). 
The Provisional IRA was the largest of the Northern Irish and Irish republican 
paramilitary groups. They emerged as a result of political and sectarian tensions in 
1966, which foreshadowed ‘The Troubles’. Loyalist
7 paramilitarism also re-emerged 
in 1966 to cause the first deaths from political violence since the 1950s IRA campaign 
(McKittrick, 1999, 23). By 1969 (the year generally regarded as the start of the 
troubles) the British army were on the streets. The increasing tension of the previous 
two years had spiralled out of control and the Provisional IRA emerged as an 
organisation (McKittrick, 1999, 30). They had split from the Official IRA in 1969 and 
                                                 
7 Loyalists: those loyal to the British Queen. 
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“the new Provisional IRA was led by men who represented traditional, conservative, 
republican values and who believed the only way to rid Ireland of the British, was by 
armed struggle” (Moloney, 2002, 74).  
In the thirty years of the Troubles they were responsible for almost half the deaths 
(1771 of the 3636) (McKittrick, 1999, 1745), making them the main aggressor in the 
conflict (Alonso, 2007, 5). In the years to come they would be responsible for the 
Enniskillen bombing which killed eleven civilians, the Bloody Friday bombings in 
Belfast which killed nine people and further bombings in the UK, which caused huge 
structural damage in London and Manchester. The IRA’s political wing is Sinn Fein, 
which subsequently entered into the peace process and signed the Good Friday 
Agreement. Martin McGuinness, of Sinn Fein, is now the Deputy First Minister in the 
new Northern Irish Assembly.  
 
Social Sanction and Support  
“In the cases of Ireland and Spain, public opinion rejected the use of civilian 
casualties, including the rejection of suicide terror. This led the IRA to alter tactics 
that involved civilian deaths resulting from their bombing campaign” (Bloom, 2005, 
134). The IRA “learned how to avoid being isolated from their own communities” 
(O’Brien, 1999, 20). This is not only clear from the behaviour of militant groups, it is 
also clear from their rhetoric. The IRA leader Sean MacStiofan wrote “the Republican 
interest in retaining popular support clearly lay in causing as few” casualties “as 
possible” (MacStiofan, 1975, 214), and Gerry Adams explained it was a necessity “to 
force the republican movement into a complete and utter reliance on the people’s 
support” (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2005, 220). Gerry Adams also wrote in a 
column in the Republican News saying “the constant theme was the politicisation of 
the struggle, how to fight a long war without becoming isolated from the people” i.e. 
the constituency (O’Brien, 1999, 107). 
 
This shows they were aware that their constituents, who lived in Northern Ireland, 
would reject tactics that targeted civilians. Indeed Bloom argues “the IRA abandoned 
violence against civilians when they observed public reaction to Derry, the 1974 pub 
bombings, and Omagh” (Bloom, 2005, 136). With regards to the Omagh bomb, which 
killed twenty nine civilians “the strength of the public backlash against the bombers 
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forced the Real IRA to declare a ceasefire” (Guelke, 2006, 103). The public reaction 
and the lack of social sanction for the use of human bombs, are outlined in the next 
section.  
 
Conditions and Political Opportunity Structure 
Applying the political opportunity structure we see that the Provisional IRA had 
social change, opportunities, contentious politics, repertoires of contention, 
mobilization and collective action frames. Repertoires of contention for the Catholic 
community were established first by marches by the civil rights movements, which 
were duly banned by the state and which saw police excesses broadcast around the 
world (Moloney, 2002, 74). Grievances and political injustices were apparent in 
gerrymandering
8, internment without trial, police brutality and in the legal apparatus 
of the state, such as the Special Powers Act. The Act gave exceptional powers to 
arrest, detain without trial and suppress political dissent. So severe were its penalties 
that a South African prime minister during apartheid remarked he would swap all his 
emergency laws for one clause of the SPA (Moloney, 2002, 39).  
 
These injustices and grievances allowed the IRA to use more extreme collective 
action frames and mobilization, and to justify the use of violence and armed struggle. 
The Provisionals also used certain events and opportunities, such as Bloody Sunday to 
mobilize recruits and further a sense of collective identity. Bloody Sunday happened 
on the 30th January 1972. Thirteen Catholics were killed when soldiers of a British 
paratroop regiment opened fire during a civil rights march in Londonderry  (BBC 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry Report). Afterwards young people were said to be queuing up 
by the hundreds to join the IRA (Moloney, 2002, 110). The IRA also used the hunger 
strikes by IRA and republican prisoners, who were demanding political rights in jail, 
to form collective identity and to mobilise people. “The unplanned by-product of the 
hunger strikes was an almost volcanic upsurge in popular support for the Republican 
Movement” (O’Brien, 1999, 124). A sense of collective identity, oppression, and 
grievance were some of the reasons recruits joined up in such large numbers, as well 
as defined common enemy. 
 
                                                 
8 Gerrymandering: moving voting borders to give the maximum number of seats to the Unionists. 
  22   
Constituency constraints 
Despite all the political opportunities, the IRA did not use suicide missions, and while 
they used violence they did attempt to minimise casualties. But there were still 
instances of extreme violence and in total the IRA were responsible for 1,771 deaths 
(McKittrick, 1999, 1475). However, these instances of extreme violence resulted in 
constituency costs and had to be avoided. Most terrorist groups rely on their 
constituency for support so have to be careful not to alienate them, and when the IRA 
called in bomb warnings in London, they could successfully terrorise people but 
without killing them. It was enough to demonstrate that they could. “They knew that 
to have committed a large-scale atrocity would have alienated their supporters at 
home” (Richardson, 2006, 176). Indeed, “an analysis of the pattern of IRA violence 
shows a chronic concern on their part to tailor their targeting strategies in such a way 
as to inflict harm, gain attention and raise the costs for Britain of its presence in 
Northern Ireland, but not to alienate the Catholic population in the province” 
(Richardson, 2006, 84).   
 
That is not to say that the IRA have never thought of using human bombs, they did. 
IRA members did not take their own lives; they forced others to do so by kidnapping 
their families and threatening them. The first happened on the 24th October 1990 in 
Coshquin on the Donegal-Derry Border when they kidnapped a man’s family and they 
forced him to drive into a British Army checkpoint. The IRA then detonated the bomb 
he was carrying and he was killed along with five British soldiers. Others followed in 
the weeks ahead, but it “was a public relations disaster.” There was criticism, public 
outrage and despair among IRA members, and the human bombs were never used 
again (Moloney, 2002, 348-349). The cost of using suicide and human bombs were 
too high and because they were not socially sanctioned they could not be used.  
 
By the early 1990s the IRA campaign had become “deeply unpopular and deeply 
offensive to the vast majority of people and politicians in the Republic, as a series of 
elections had proven” (O’Brien, 1999, 225).  Sinn Fein announced a new ‘peace 
initiative’ in 1992 and they signalled strongly that they wished to enter a peace 
process. In 1994 the IRA called a ceasefire and Sinn Fein entered into the peace 
process. Their ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ paper explicitly accepted “the need to 
obtain the consent of the majority of people in the North” (O’Brien, 1999, 228). 
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However there was much internal strife within the IRA and there were numerous 
setbacks in negotiations with the Irish and British governments. The IRA broke its 
ceasefire with an attack on Canary Wharf in 1996, but still Sinn Fein gained a “record 
vote” in the Northern Irish elections (McKittrick, 1999, 1386). The peace process 
continued on, even if it was a slow process fraught with difficulties, and 1998 brought 
the historic Good Friday Agreement. In the Republic of Ireland 94.5 per cent of 
people voted in favour of the Agreement and 71 per cent voted in favour in Northern 
Ireland. But 1998 was also the year when the Real IRA bomb in Omagh killed 
twenty-nine people, the highest death toll of the conflict (McKittrick, 1999, 1422). 
Given the outrage and horror at such a display of violence against civilians, instead of 
derailing the peace process, it galvanised the politicians and the public who wanted to 
turn their back on such violence for good.  
 
The IRA officially decommissioned and declared a ceasefire on the 25th July 2005, 
ending political violence and pursing a purely political democratic route, 
constitutionally underpinned by the Good Friday Agreement, which was in 
accordance with the wishes of the majority of people in Ireland and Northern Ireland.
9 
The situation in Northern Ireland continues to be a situation of contentious politics, 
despite ceasefires and decommissioning. The unionist party, the DUP, and Sinn Fein 
are now in government together and there remain many difficulties surrounding 
policing and justice and how these are to be devolved to the Northern Irish Assembly 
in Stormont. There has also been increased activity by dissident republicans, and in 
recent months they have killed a police officer and two British Army soldiers.  
 
With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement there is now democratic 
constitutionalism in Northern Ireland. The people of Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland voted for the Agreement, and this democratic constitutionalism 
ensures that the people of Northern Ireland who are subject to the rules, under which 
they are governed, have the right to contest and negotiate those rules and norms, 
democratically and have them changed. But this was not always the case in Northern 
                                                 
9 IRA Ceasefire Statement July 28
th 2005:   "The leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally 
ordered an end to the armed campaign. All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. All volunteers 
have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through 
exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.”  
Available online from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4724599.stm. 
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Ireland. While there were democratic institutions and democracy, it was limited at 
certain times and it was difficult for the Catholic nationalists to forward a political 
agenda through contestation and negotiation. Within this setting the IRA emerged to 
challenge the political structures using political violence. But because they were 
operating in a democracy their constituency rejected the use of extreme forms of 
political violence which targeted and indiscriminately killed civilians. The IRA did 
not use suicide attacks because if the IRA had carried out systematic indiscriminate 
violence, the constituency support would drop (Kalyvas and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2005, 
221). This is illustrated by the manner in which the use of human bombers was 
condemned by the IRA’s constituency. The IRA’s constituency was not prepared for 
extreme political violence to be carried out by the IRA, acting as their representatives, 
especially where there were other political avenues, and other forms of contestation 
and negotiation available, through democratic institutions. Within this political setting 
the IRA pursued their “Armalite and ballot box” policy, and eventually as the military 
campaign held them back from gathering more social support and sanction, they 
pursued purely political policies, through the peace process.  
 
 
LIMITS OF CONSTITUENCY: RELIGION AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTORS 
From the two case studies above we can see how political opportunity structures 
allow militants to legitimize political violence and suicide missions to their 
constituency, and how constituency can act as a constraint on militant groups if there 
is no social sanction for suicide missions. However, the case studies refer to ethno 
nationalist and regionally defined conflicts, rather than religious and transnational 
conflicts. Where constituency is limited, as a constraint, is with regards to religious 
militants, and to transnational global militants. As explained earlier, religion is not the 
cause of suicide missions but this section of the paper discusses how religious and 
transnational groups are not as constrained by constituency, as regionally defined 
ethno nationalist groups. In particular many make the point that religious groups are 
not trying “to win favour with an external constituency” and therefore are not 
constrained by a regionally defined constituency but rather are constrained by their 
own religious leaders (Enders, 2002, 5; Sandler, 2003, 784).  Transnational global 
actors are also problematic to constrain, because they do not “confine their actions to 
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a region where a conflict is already taking place” (Guelke, 2006) and therefore their 
constituency is not always local, and cannot necessarily constrain them. If the militant 
group carries out high levels of anti civilian violence without reference to constraints 
imposed by the constituency of the region where the conflict is already taking place, 
then they are operating for the benefit of a different constituency, most likely a global 
constituency, and will not be constrained by the local constituency. This is why the 
distinction between local and global is important. 
 
We currently see a change from ‘old/classical terrorism’, to a ‘new terrorism’, which 
“operates indiscriminately and can inflict heavy losses on civilians who have no direct 
involvement in the conflict” (Khosrokhavar, 2005, 163). Religious fundamentalist 
terrorists operating on a global scale “seek out mass casualties, viewing anyone not 
with them as against them” (Enders, 2002, 14).  It is of note that Britain lost sixty-
seven of its citizens in the September 11 attacks, carried out by the global religious 
group al Qaeda, more than any single terrorist attack by the IRA in over thirty years 
(Richardson, 2006, 177). The link between ‘new terrorism’ and its high casualty 
levels and indiscriminate killings, is because the religious groups who carry out the 
attacks “seek to appeal to no other constituency than themselves” and God (Hoffman, 
1998, 93-95). “Thus the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular terrorists 
by the desire to appeal to a tacitly supportive or uncommitted constituency are not 
relevant to the religious terrorist” (Hoffmann, 1998, 95). 
 
But perhaps public opinion in the Muslim world may be able to act as a constraint on 
some Islamic religious transnational groups? Al Qaeda Iraq for example “intended to 
galvanise support for their cause, from the wider Muslim world” as well as Iraqis 
(Hafez, 2007, 158). But the unprecedented level and indiscriminate nature of civilian 
deaths carried out by them, resulted in a backlash within Iraq and the wider Muslim 
world. In 2006 the insurgents were openly turning against Al Qaeda and by 2007 
Awakening groups, which comprised of Sunni Muslim tribesmen previously involved 
with the insurgency, were working with the occupying American force, against al 
Qaeda, and were being armed by the Americans (IHT, 11.06.07). They were a key 
factor in the “surge” by pushing al Qaeda out of the areas they control and taking over 
security (Kahl, 2008). Increasingly they are becoming integrated into the new Iraqi 
political system. “Members of the Baghdad Awakening, estimated to number about 
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54,000, move to the Iraqi government payroll on 1 October (2008), with others to 
follow” (BBC 01.10.08) and Nouri al Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister has promised to 
incorporate 20 per cent of the Sons of Iraq, “mostly Sunni tribal militia members and 
former insurgents,” into Iraq’s security and police forces and “provide the remainder 
with nonsecurity jobs” (Kahl, 2008).  
 
With regard to world wide Muslim opinion there is also potential for the influence of 
‘constituency’ and social movement. A 47-nation survey by the Pew Centre found 
that “the percentage of Muslims saying that suicide bombing is justified in the defense 
of Islam has declined dramatically over the past five years (2002-2007.) In Lebanon, 
for example, just 34% of Muslims say suicide bombings in the defense of Islam are 
often or sometimes justified; in 2002, 74% expressed this view” (Pew Centre Report, 
24.07.07). This reflects a major change in terms of Muslim public opinion, during the 
Iraq war, and may impact on the use of suicide missions. It is also of note that 
Muslims are “on average more likely than the American public to unequivocally 
condemn attacks on civilians” according to the World Public Opinion report (Esposito 
and Mogahed, 2007, 94) and this could be used with regards to constituency when 
dealing with the resort of political violence directed against civilians. Many argue this 
point and say, “Islam may be a powerful weapon for discrediting terrorists and 
limiting the growth of terrorism” (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007, 161). 
 
While religion may act as a powerful tool against the use of anti civilan violence, it is 
also used by militants as a “good source of framing” to sanction violence. This is 
because religion, as well as ethnicity and nationalism, allow militants the opportunity 
to create a collective identity, to frame the conflict in ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ terms and 
mobilize support from constituencies in situations of contentious politics (Tarrow, 
1998, 112). Religion is being used and manipulated in conflicts worldwide, in order to 
achieve militant goals, but religion alone is not the cause of suicide missions and 
political violence. There is no doubt that religious groups are less constrained in their 
use of violence and they cause higher death tolls (Hoffmann, 1998, 93), but 
Khosrokhavar makes the point that while religion is no more than a pretext, the 
absence of a theological framework does not prevent groups such as Hamas, GIA or 
the Taliban from “justifying their actions in religious terms” to sanction their use 
violence (Khosrokhavar, 2005, 48). In the case of Osama Bin Laden, “his agenda is a 
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basically political one, though it is couched of course in religious language and 
imagery” (Burke, 2004, 23). However while this may be true, religious transnational 
groups, kill and attack more civilians than nonreligious groups, and it is not yet clear 
to what extent, if any, constituency and social movement can impact on this.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Suicide missions represent a particularly lethal and extreme form of political violence, 
which targets and indiscriminately kills civilians in unprecedented numbers. Suicide 
missions are successful in achieving both military and psychological aims. Militarily 
they are capable of huge structural damage, and on average kill four times as many 
people as an ordinary bomb. Psychologically, due to their indiscriminate nature and 
the fact that they frequently target civilians, they cause fear and uncertainty because 
civilians do not know when the suicide bomber will strike next. They are also a form 
of propaganda: the suicide mission is the poor man’s F16, for the oppressed to be able 
to fight back against the world’s largest armies and superpowers. Where this 
propaganda is successful it leads to more people being ‘inspired’ to commit such acts. 
Ultimately there is a devastating human cost, physically and mentally. Most worrying, 
as referred to earlier, is their increased use, the frequency of attacks, in the 
geographical spread of attacks and in the number of groups involved (Merari, 2005, 
70). 
 
It is vital that we “understand and act on the root causes” of suicide missions (Atran, 
2004, 72) and we currently are working off the wrong understandings (Atran, 2004, 
73). The poverty of singular explanations such as religion, economics, strategic logic 
and psychological approaches has been dealt with in earlier sections. The explanation 
for the resort to suicide missions is complex and is not mono-causal, and no one 
explanatory approach is sufficient. By using the political opportunity structure model 
the paper shows how suicide missions and other forms of political violence are 
sanctioned using collective action frames, mobilization and repertoires of contention, 
in situations of contentious politics. The current set of explanations is incomplete 
without reference to constituency and social sanction, which in certain contexts may 
act as a one of the constraints on the resort of suicide missions and other forms of 
extreme political violence, which are carried out by militant groups in situations of 
contentious politics. The paper uses the case studies of Hamas and the IRA to 
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illustrate the emergence of militant groups and the resort to violence to forward a 
political agenda, using the political opportunity structure approach and by focusing on 
constituency. Groups have different objectives, and use different tactics and levels of 
violence at different times of the conflict. This is because they are operating within a 
political process, and within political structures that provide constraints and 
opportunities at different times. If social movements are given the opportunity to 
contest and negotiate the power structures, they do so, as is the norm in democratic 
countries. However in the absence of such an opportunity, extreme political violence 
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